

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 HELSINKI 1916

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TAGS: NATO, UR, NO, SE, FI/ XZ
SUBJ: KEKKONEN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE PROPOSALS: THE FINNISH VIEW

REF: HELSINKI 1457(NOTAL, HELSINKI 1857(NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S PROPOSALS CONCERNING A
NORDIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE (NWFZ) GO BEYOND PREVIOUS
FINNISH INITIATIVES IN THIS AREA. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS
HAVE IN FACT BEEN CAREFULLY PLANNED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS FOR
PRESENTATION AT THIS TIME. WHEREAS IN RECENT YEARS FINLAND
HAS OCCASIONALLY PUT FORTH ITS NORDIC NWFZ VIEWS ON A PRO-
FORMA BASIS, APPARENTLY SIMPLY TO KEEP THE CONCEPT ALIVE,
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THIS TIME THE FINNS MEAN SERIOUSLY TO PURSUE THE PRO-
POSALS ACTIVELY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. THIS MESSAGE
REPORTS THE VIEWS OF FINNISH OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE PURPOSE,
MOTIVATION, AND TIMING OF THE PROPOSAL AND THE STEPS FINLAND IS
TAKING TO FOLLOW UP ON THE PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

2. WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN A ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WITH

FINNISH OFFICIALS HIGHLY PLACED IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY CONCERNING PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S MAY 8 SPEECH IN STOCKHOLM ON NORDIC SECURITY. FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS GO CONSIDERABLY BEYOND PREVIOUS FINNISH INITIATIVES CONCERNING A NORDIC NWFZ AND THAT THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT INTENDS SERIOUSLY TO PURSUE ITS PROPOSALS. THESE OFFICIALS CITE THREE BASIC FEATURES OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. THE FIRST IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE, IN ESSENCE A RESTATEMENT OF THE LONG-STANDING FINNISH PROPOSAL FIRST PUT FORWARD IN 1963. THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THIS PROPOSAL IS FOR THE NORDIC COUNTRIES TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN INTERNATIONALLY BINDING NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT DEFINE THIS ASPECT MORE COMPLETELY IN HIS LATEST SPEECH, SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY FINNISH OFFICIALS AS PROHIBITING BOTH IN TIME OF PEACE AND OF WAR THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS WITHIN THE NORDIC AREA, THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR ARMS FROM ELASWHERE AND THEIR IMPORTATION IN THE NAME OF OTHER STATES. HOWEVER, THE FINNS HAVE NOW REACHED TO CONCLUSION THAT BECAUSE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, THE ORIGINAL FINNISH NORDICS NFWZ CONCEPT IS NO LONGER ADEQUATE TO ASSURE THAT THE NORDIC COUNTRIES WILL BE ABLE TO REMAIN OUTSIDE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC SPECULATIONS. THEREFORE, THE NEW FINNISH POSITION IS THAT THE PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS

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AMONG THE NORDIC COUNTRIES SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE "THE LEADING POWERS, WHOSE SECUIRTY INTERESTS OR STRATEGIC POSTURE THE PROPOSED ARRANGMENTS WOULD AFFECT ONE WAY OF ANOTHER."

3. THE SCOND FEATURE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS THAT IN ADDITIONL TO A NORDIC NWFZ, NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD AIM AS WELL AS AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS, AS PART OF THEIR SALT TALKS, "ON BANNING CRUISE MISSILES, ON FREEZING THEIR DEVELOPMENT, OR AT LEAST SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITING THEIR RANGE." THIRDLY, NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ACHIEVE ASSURANCES BY THE GREAT POWER TO THE NORIDC COUNTRIES THAT "NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE USED AGAINST THEIR TERRITORIES UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES." THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THESE ASSURANCES AS "NEGATIVE SECURITY GUARANTEES." HE ALSO IMPLIED IN HIS SPEECH THAT HIS PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THE NORIDC AREA MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS ONE OF A NUMBER OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES TO BE EXPLORED IN THE EUROPEAN REGION. HE DEPLORED THAT THE MANY FORUMS FOR DISARMAMENT TALKS DOD NOT INCLUDE ONE WHICH WOULD DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH EUROPE, A CLEAR RERENCES TO THE FINNISH POSITION FAVORING

EUROPEAN-WIDE DISARMAMENT TALKS ON A CSCE BASIS, I.E.
INCLUDING THE US AND CANADA.

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4. WE HAVE SOUGHT EXPLANATIONS FROM THE FINNS CONCERN-
ING THE TIME AND MOTIVATION OF THE FINNISH PROPOSALS.
REGARDING TIMING, THE OFFICIALS MADE CLEAR THAT THE
FINNISH PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN PLANNED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.
A DELIBERATE DECISION WAS REACHED TO LAUNCH THE PROPSAL
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE BELGRADE CSDE CONFERENCE
AND BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE UN SPECAIL ON DISRMAMENT
(ALTHOUGH AT ONE POINT CONSIDERATION WAS APPARENTLY GIVEN
TO KEKKONEN PRESENTING HIS PROPOSALS IN NEW YORK AT THE
UNSSOD). CONCERNING MOTIVATION, THE OFFICIALS STRESSED
THE RAPID PACE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPON TECHNOLOGY
THAT "IS LIKELY TO INTRODUCE NEW UNCERTAINTIES INTO THE
NORDIC SECURITY SITUATION," AS KEKKONEN INDICATED IN HIS
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SPEECH. THEY SAID THAT IN THE FINNISH VIEW THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS, COMBINED WITH THE LAGGING PACE OF DISARMAMENT TALKS BETWEEN THE MAJOR POWERS, RAISES NEW THREAT TO NORDIC SECURITY AND UNDERMINS THE FINNISH HOPE THAT THE NORDIC AREA CAN REMAIN ISOLATED FROM NUCLEAR STRATEGY. THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE RENDERED INADEQUATE THE ORIGINAL FINNISH PROPOSAL CONCERNING ANORDIC NWFZ AND HAVE ADDED NEW URGENCY TO THE NEED FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT. INDIRECTLY, OFFICIALS ALLUDED TO THEIR CONCERN THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US/USSR RELATIONS MAY PRESAGE A SLOWDOWN IN DETENTE AND A PERIOD OF COOL US/USSR RELATIONS, THEREBY ADDING TO ANXIETIES IN THE NORDIC AREA.

5. WE COMMENTED IN OUR DISCUSSION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SEEMS UNBALANCED WHEN SPEAKING OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS INASMUCH AS IT REFERS ONLY TO THE NEUTRON WEAPON AND CRUISE MISSILES, BOTH OF WHICH ARE US WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THE OFFICIALS SAID THAT REFERENCE TO THE NEUTRON BOMB IN THE SPEECH WAS MADE BECAUSE THE NEUTRON BOMB HAS BECOME A VERTIABLE SYMBOL OF DANGEROUS NEW NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THEROIES OF LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR WHICH THE FINNS FIND ABHORRENT. HOWEVER, THEY SAID THE REAL OBJECT OF FINNISH CONCERN IS THE CRUISE MISSILE. THE OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRUISE MISSILE INTRODUCES COMPLETELY NEW DIMENSIONS TO NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELVIERY BECAUSE, IN CONTRAST TO INTERCONTINENTAL OR MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WHICH ARCH PERHPAS HUNDREDS OF MILES OVER COUNTRIES LOCATED BETWEEN LAUNCHING POINT AND TARGET, CRUISE MISSILES FLY AT ALTITUDES AS LOW AS 150 METERS, VIOLATING THE AIRSPACE OF COUNTRIES LOCATED ALONG THE FLIGHT PATH BETWEEN LAUNCHING POINT AND TARGET. CONFIDENTIAL

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THEY POINTED OUT, AS DID KEKKONEN IN HIS SPEECH, THAT A QUICK GLANCE AT THE MAP OF EUROPEA SHOWS THE PROBLEM CLEARLY. CRUISE MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM NORDIC TERRITORIES, FROM NORDIC TERRITORIAL WATERS, OR FROM POINTS IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES HAVE AN ADVANTAGEOUS ROUTE TO THE INDUSTRIAL HEART OF THE SOVIET UNION COMPARED TO OTHER LAUNCH SITES AVAILABLE TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

6. THE FINNISH OFFICIALS POINTED OUT ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE CRUISE MISSILE PROBLEM WHICH IS OF CONCERN TO THE FINNS AND WHICH THEY BELIEVE SHOULD BE OF CONCERN

TO THE OTHER NORDICS. THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LYING BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND POSSIBLE CRUISE MISSILE LAUNCH POINTS IN WESTERN EUROPE POSSESS EXTENSIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS WHICH PERHPAS CAN BE IMPROVED TO DEFEND AGAINST A CRUISE MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM THAT DIRECTION. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, DO NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD BE USED AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES EN ROUTE TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE FINNISH OFFICIALS ALLUDED INDIRECTLY BUT CLEARLY TO THEIR CONCERN THAT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRUISE MISSILE THREAT CONCEIVABLY COULD LEAD TO SOVIET PRESSURE ON FINLAND UNDER THE 1948 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH AN ANTI-CRUISE-MISSILE DEFENSE OR DETECTION SYSTEM ON FINNISH SOIL TO PROVIDE BETTER PROTECTION TO THE SOVIETS FROM CRUISE MISSILES LAUNCHED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE NORDIC DIRECTION.

7. THE FINNS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE NOT FOLLOWD UP DIPLOMATICALLY ON FINNISH POLICY DELCARATIONS OR PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS. RATHER, PREVIOUS INITIATIVES SEEMD DESIGNED MORE TO REMIND NORDIC OPINION THAT THE FINNISH PROPOSAL STILL STANDS. HOWEVER, THE FINNISH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE HELD DISCUSSIONS MADE IT CLEAR

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THAT THIS TIME FINLAND INTENDS TO PURSUE ITS PROPOSAL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. OFFICIALS SAID PRESIDENT KEKKONEN CHOSE DLIBERATELY NOT TO CONSULT WITH ANY OTHER COUNTRIES PRIOR TO LAUNCHING HIS PROPOSAL MAY 8. OFFICIALS SAID THE REASONS FOR THIS DECISIONS WAS THAT FINLAND DID NOT EXPECT FAVORABLE REACTIONS IN ALL QUARTERS AND DID NOT WANT TO PREJUDICE ITS OR ANYONE ELSE'S POSITION BEFOREHAND. RATHER, THE FINNS WANTED TO PRESENT THEIR PROPOAL IN UNADULTERATED FORM.

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ALSO, OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT BY NOT DISCUSSING THE PROPOSAL BEFOREHAND THE FINNS HOPED TO BE ABLE TO REFUTE ANY ALLEGATION THAT FINLAND HAS COORDINATED ITS APPROCH WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND IS ACTING AS A SOVIET CATSPAW. THE OFFICIALS URGED WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS THAT WE ACCEPT THE THRTHFULNESS OF THEIR ASSERTION THAT THIS INITIATIVE IS ENTIRELY FINNISH IN ORIGINA AND WAS NOT IN ANY WAY DISCUSSWD WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

8. THE FINNISH MFA UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, KEIJO KORHONEN, THE REPUTED AUTHOR IS THE KEKKONEN STATEMENT, TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT HE HAS BEEN CHARGED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH FOLLOWING UP ON THE PROPOSAL.
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HE SAID THAT FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 8 SPEECH, HE HAS BEEN IN DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE NORDIC COUNTRIES INVOLVED (NORWAY, DENMARK, AND SWEDEN). ON MAY 12 HE ALSO BRIEFED SOVIET AMBASSDAOR MENDELEVICH CONCERNING THE FINNISH PROPOSALS DURING THE LATTER'S PRESENCE IN HELSINKI AS HEAS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER (CAT) TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES. KORHONEN SAID THAT ON JUNE 1 IN WASHINGTON HE MET WITH DAVID AARON OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TO EXPLAIN THE FINNISH PROPOSAL (HELSINKI 1857). KORHONEN CHARACTERIZED THE REACTIONS RECEIVED FROM THE NORIDC COUNTRIES AS A BIT MORE FAVORABLE THAT THE FINNS HAD ANTICIPATED. HE SAID THERE HAS YET BEEN NO OFFICIAL REACTIONS FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH

HE NOTED THAT TASS AND PRAVDA PRESS ARTICLES HAVE BEEN MODERATELY ENCOURAGING. KORHONEN INDICATED THAT HE CONSIDERS HIS CONTACT WITH THE NSC AS PRELIMINARY AND SAID THAT FINLAND HOPES TO HEAR FURTHER FROM THE UNITED STATES ON ITS PROPOSAL. HE SAID HE HAD ASKED MR. AARON WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SOMEONE IN THE US GOVERNMENT TO BE DESIGNATED AS THE POINT OF CONTACT WITH FINLAND ON THIS ISSUE. KORJONEN WILL CONTINUE HIS BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS ON THE FINNISH PROPOSAL. HE SAID THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD INDICATED IN HIS SPEECH, THERE FIRST MUST BE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE NORDICS THEMSELVES, ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OF THE MAJOR POWERS WOULD BE WELCOME AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE STAGE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT FINLAND AND THE NORDICS HAVE AGREED THE CONTACTS WOULD BE BILATERAL FOR NOW, BEGINNING WITH TALKS IN SWEDEN IN JULY AND IN NORWAY IN AUGUST.

9. IN THE FINNISH VIEWS THE NORDIC NWFZ REFERS SPECIFIC-
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ALLY TO THE FOUR NORDIC COUNTRIES (EXCLUDING ICELAND) AND THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS WHICH ONE OFFICIAL DEFINED AS EXTENDING TO 3 OR 12 MILES. THE OFFICIALS DREW ATTENTION TO THE PHRASE IN THE KKKONEN SPEECH THAT NECESSARY NORDIC ARMS CONTROL ARRANGMENTS "CAN BE MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING SECURITY POLICY SOLUTIONS"; THEY SAID THAT THIS PHRASE WAS MEANT TO CONVEY THE FINNISH VIEW THAT ITS PROPOSALS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CONTINUED DANISH AND NORWEGIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. OFFICIALS ALSO SAID THAT IN PROPOSING DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE NORDICS ON THIS SUBJECT THE FINNS REALIZE THAT THE OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES MAY THEMSELVES HAVE ADDITIONAL RELATED PROPOSALS AND CONCEPTS WHICH THEY MAY WISH TO INTRODUCE INTO THE CONVERSATION. ONE OFFICIALS SPECULATED THAT THE SWEDES MAY WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET SUBMARINE ACTIVITY IN THE BALTIC, AND THE NORWEGIANS MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NORDICS NWFZ FOR THE BARENTS SEA, FOR EXAMPLE, OR FOR SVALBARD. THE OFFICIALS NOTED THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NORDIC NWFZ HAS BEEN RATHER AMBIVALENT IN RECENT YEARS AND THAT CONVERSATIONS AMONG THE NORDICS ON THIS SUBJECT MAY RAISE OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS THE KOLA PENINSULA THAT ARE INCONVENIENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE OFFICIALS STRESSED THAT THE FINNS WOULD EXPECT ANY NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF THIS KIND TO SURFACE DURING NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE NORDIC COUNTRIES.

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10. FINALLY, WE ASKED THE FINNISH OFFICIALS AGAIN WHY
FINLAND HAS RAISED THIS PROPOSAL IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY,
THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR PROPOSAL
FROM THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED, PERHPAS NOT EVEN FROM
THE SOVIET UNION. THE OFFICIALS REPLIED THAT IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO COMPLETELY
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING TALKS UNDER WAY
ON THE SUBJECT. THEY PROFESS THAT THEY ARE NOT DIS-
COURAGED BY THE REACTIONS THEY HAVE RECEIVED THUS FAR.
MOREOVER, THEY SAY THAT EVEN THE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC
SOUNDINGS THAT THEY ARE CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING SERVE
THE USEFUL PURPOSE OF FOCUSING NORDIC ATTENTION ON
THESE PROBLEMS AND SENSITIZING THEM TO THE DANGERS
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PRESENTED TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES BY THE RAPID DEVELOP-

MENT OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

11. COMMENT: THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY SERIOUS NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE FINNIHS PROPOSALS. WE REMIAN PUZZLED AS TO WHY THE FINNS ARE PROPOSING NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL AND COMPLEX ISSUES WHEN NEGOTIATIONS (AS OPPOSED TO BILATERAL CONTACTS) STAND VIRTUALLY NO CHANGE OF EVEN GETTING UNDER WAY, MUCH LEASS SUCCEEDING. WE ARE CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FINNS ARE UTTERLY SERIOUS IN THIS INITIATIVE AND THAT IT HAS BROAD SUPPORT IN THE FINNISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY. WE ARE NOT, OF COURSE, IN A POSITION TO VERIFY THE FINNISH ASSERTION THAT THE PROPOSALS WERE NOT DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE DO NOTE THAT MOSCOW 11470 TENDS TO SUPPORT THE FINNS' CLAIM THAT THIS IS STRICTLY THEIR OWN INITIATIVE. AFTER CAREFUL USG STUDY OF THE PROPOSALS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT NEXT STEPS, IF ANY, MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE U.S. WE WHOULD PROBABLY BEGIN WITH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO MAINTAIN OUR TRADITIONAL POSTURE THAT THIS KIND OF PROPOSAL IS REALLY A SUBJECT FOR THE NORDICS ALONE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO DEVELOP A MORE DETAILED RESPONSE IN TERMS OF THE US INTEREST NOW THAT THE PROPOSALS CLEARLY REFER TO THE US AND HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGIC INTERESTS.

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